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ALD-262

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 18-1536
____________
IN RE: ANDRE COOPER,
Petitioner
__________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from
the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 2-01-cr-00512-005)
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21
July 12, 2018
Before: MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2018)
___________
OPINION *
___________

PER CURIAM
Petitioner Andre Cooper petitions for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition.
Cooper was convicted, following a jury trial in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, of participation in the affairs of an interstate
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (Count 8); conspiracy to murder in
aid of racketeering (Count 9); the murder of Tracey Saunders in aid of racketeering
(Count 10); tampering with witness Tracey Saunders by murder (Count 11); conspiracy
to murder Antonio Rykard in aid of racketeering (Count 14); the murder of Antonio
Rykard in aid of racketeering (Count 15); conspiracy to murder Karriem Washington in
aid of racketeering (Count 21); the murder of Karriem Washington in aid of racketeering
(Count 22); using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 23);
conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine (Count 25); conspiracy to
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in a school zone (Count 26); possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute (Counts 29, 31); possessing a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime (Counts 30, 32); and distribution of cocaine (Counts 42 and 43).
On July 27, 2006, the District Court sentenced Cooper as follows: life
imprisonment with no possibility for parole on Counts 10, 15, and 22 (the murder
counts), the sentences to run consecutively to each other, N.T., 7/27/06, at 24-25; a term
of imprisonment of 10 years on Count 23, the sentence to run consecutively “to each of
the life imprisonment sentences” on Counts 10, 15 and 22, id. at 25; a term of
imprisonment of 10 years on Count 30, the sentence to run consecutively “to each of”
Counts 10, 15, 22 and 23, id. at 26; a term of imprisonment of 10 years on Count 32, the
sentence to run consecutively “to each of” Counts 10, 15, 22, 23 and 30, id.; and, as to
“the remaining counts,” a term of imprisonment of 10 years to “run concurrently with the
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life imprisonment sentence,” id. at 25. Those remaining counts would be 8, 9, 11, 14, 21,
25, 26, 29, 31, 42, and 43.
Cooper appealed the criminal judgment and we affirmed, see United States v.
Cooper, 343 F. App’x 830 (3d Cir. 2009). In 2010, Cooper filed a motion to vacate
sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied relief on the merits, and we denied
Cooper’s request for a certificate of appealability. We have also denied several
applications by Cooper for leave to file second or successive § 2255 motions.
In 2016, Cooper filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, contending that the District Court
failed to sentence him on Counts 8 and 11. The District Court denied the Rule 60 motion
and we denied Cooper’s request for a certificate of appealability.
Cooper now has filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming, as he did in his
Rule 60 motion, that the District Court failed to sentence him on Count 8, participation in
the affairs of an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and Count 11 (tampering with witness Tracey Saunders
by murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111(a), 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C), and
1512(a)(2)(A)). He seeks to be sentenced by the District Court on these counts;
otherwise, he argues, they should be dismissed. Petition, at 1-2. He further argues that
the error is a fundamental one, and that, having unsuccessfully moved for relief under
Rule 60, he now has no other adequate means for obtaining relief. Cooper has attached a
copy of the sentencing transcript to his mandamus petition, which he says supports his
argument.
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We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Our jurisdiction derives from 28
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” A writ of
mandamus is an extreme remedy that we grant only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr
v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). To justify the use of this
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. See Haines v.
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).
We have reviewed the sentencing transcript but do not agree that it supports
Cooper’s argument that the District Court did not sentence him on Counts 8 and 11. On
the contrary, the transcript indicates that, after sentencing Cooper on certain specific
counts to consecutive sentences of varying lengths, the District Court sentenced him on
“the remaining counts” to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10 years, id. at 25. This
reference to the remaining counts should include Counts 8 and 11, and Cooper does not
argue otherwise. Accordingly, insofar as the transcript does not provide clear factual
support for his assertion that he was not sentenced on Counts 8 and 11, Cooper has not
shown both a clear and indisputable right to the writ.
We note that, although a written copy of the criminal Judgment has not been
provided with Cooper’s petition, the purported contents of the Judgment were transcribed
on the criminal docket by court staff, see Docket Entry No. 911. The transcribed contents
state that Cooper’s sentence on each of Counts 8 and 11 is a concurrent term of life
imprisonment. This difference in the sentences might suggest either that there was a
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transcription error in recording the contents of the criminal Judgment, or that there is an
actual conflict between the sentence imposed on the record in open court and the written
Judgment, see generally United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[W]hen the two sentences are in conflict, the oral pronouncement [in the defendant’s
presence] prevails over the written judgment.”). Either way, the record does not support
an assertion that Cooper was not sentenced at all on Counts 8 and 11. Moreover, we are
satisfied that this issue could have been addressed on direct appeal and thus that there
were other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. Mandamus, with its “exceedingly
narrow” scope of review, is not a substitute for an appeal. In re: Chambers Development
Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting In re: Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954,
964 (3d Cir. 1997)).
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
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